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Abstract—Advances in data-driven methods have sparked
renewed interest for applications in power systems. Creating
datasets for successful application of these methods has proven
to be very challenging, especially when considering power system
security. This paper proposes a computationally efficient method
to create datasets of secure and insecure operating points. We
propose an infeasibility certificate based on separating hyper-
planes that can a-priori characterize large parts of the input
space as insecure, thus significantly reducing both computation
time and problem size. Our method can handle an order of
magnitude more control variables and creates balanced datasets
of secure and insecure operating points, which is essential for
data-driven applications. While we focus on N-1 security and
uncertainty, our method can extend to dynamic security. For
PGLib-OPF networks up to 500 buses and up to 125 control
variables, we demonstrate drastic reductions in unclassified input
space volumes and computation time, create balanced datasets,
and evaluate an illustrative data-driven application.
Index Terms—Convex relaxation, data-driven, machine learn-
ing, optimal power flow, power system operation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in data-driven methods have shown sub-
stantial potential for power system applications including
security assessment under uncertainty [1]–[6], e.g., by rapidly
estimating line flows [2], training accurate security classifiers
[3], or applying them in the context of data-driven security-
constrained optimal power flow [4] and deep learning tool-
boxes [5]. The performance of these methods, however, relies
on the quality of the underlying dataset. As historical data is
often limited and does not contain many abnormal situations,
the datasets have to be enriched through simulation. This,
however, is a highly computationally demanding task. The
resulting datasets should be balanced between secure and
insecure samples to improve classifier performance, take into
consideration all degrees of freedom of the system, and be able
to accurately represent the security boundary. In this work,
we propose an efficient method to create datasets with these
properties for data-driven applications in power systems.
The steady-state operational constraints are described by
the AC optimal power flow (AC-OPF) problem. The degrees
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of freedom of the system, i.e. the inputs characterizing each
operating point, are defined by the control variables, which in
the AC-OPF problem are generator active power and voltage
set-points. By defining these, the remaining state variables are
determined by solving the AC power flow equations [7]. Even
for medium-sized systems, the number of control variables
renders the task of creating datasets covering a wide range of
operating points very computationally challenging.
To address this challenge, we can directly classify operating
points that are infeasible with respect to the AC-OPF problem
as insecure and avoid any further stability or static security
assessment. Ref. [8] formulated infeasibility certificates to the
AC-OPF problem based on hyperspheres that certify a wide
range of operating points a-priori as insecure. Inspired by [8],
our previous work in [9] used such certificates to generate large
datasets, reducing the input space and decreasing computation
time, while considering both N-1 security and small-signal
stability. Both works [8] and [9] consider systems with up to
11 control variables. In this work, instead of hyperspheres, we
propose the use of separating hyperplanes, which, among other
important benefits, allows us to consider numbers of control
variables that are at least an order of magnitude greater than
previous methods (up to 125 in our test cases).
Another popular approach to create such datasets is through
importance sampling, e.g., [10], [11]. In power systems, how-
ever, the initial sampling space is largely unbalanced, i.e., the
volume of insecure space is several orders of magnitude larger
than the secure space, and, as we observed in [9], it can be
challenging to obtain an adequate number of secure samples.
In this work, we show how our proposed method can lead
to a balanced dataset, as it enables us to sample from inside
the secure space. A related strand of research uses historical
data and enriches them through sampling methods such as
composite modelling approaches and vine-copulas [12], [13].
However, this can neglect parts of the secure space or might
not capture abnormal operating regions.
To create representative datasets for data-driven power
system applications, we propose a computationally efficient
method which a) can deal with high input dimensionality (our
test cases have up to 125 control variables), b) provides a
detailed description of the security boundary, and c) creates
balanced classes. We apply this method to AC-OPF problems
including N-1 security and uncertainty in power injections.
The main contributions of our work are:
1) We propose an infeasibility certificate based on sepa-
rating hyperplanes. This certificate is computed using
convex relaxations of AC-OPF problems and consid-
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2ers both N-1 security and uncertainty. Compared to
the hypersphere-based method proposed in [8], our
algorithm shows two key improvements: First, separat-
ing hyperplanes allow the classification of substantially
larger parts of the input space as insecure. Second, as
these hyperplanes form a convex polyhedron, efficient
methods to sample uniformly from inside the remaining
unclassified space are available. Based on these, we
propose an efficient algorithm to maximize the volume
of the input space classified a-priori as insecure.
2) We evaluate this algorithm on PGLib-OPF networks
with up to 500 buses and number of control variables up
to 125. Compared to initial normalized input space vol-
umes of 1 (i.e. 100) based on specified control variable
bounds, the infeasibility certificates reduce the unclassi-
fied input space volumes significantly up to 10−40.
3) We propose a computationally efficient method to cre-
ate datasets for data-driven power system applications
which can handle systems where the number of control
variables is at least one order of magnitude greater than
state-of-the-art methods (e.g., [9]). Computing infeasi-
bility certificates allows us to efficiently characterize the
security boundary in detail and sample from inside the
secure space. We create balanced datasets for PGLib-
OPF networks up to 500 buses and train neural network
classifiers as an illustrative data-driven application.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we describe
the AC-OPF problem including N-1 security and uncertainty,
and its convex relaxation. In Section III, we outline our pro-
posed methodology to create datasets, including the infeasibil-
ity certificate, boundary description, and sampling from inside
the secure space. Section IV presents simulation results on
PGLib-OPF networks up to 500 buses. Section V concludes.
II. OPTIMAL POWER FLOW FORMULATION
This section presents the AC-OPF formulations necessary
for deriving the dataset creation methodology. In particular,
we formulate the N-1 security-constrained preventive AC-OPF
problem considering uncertainty in power injections, and its
quadratic convex (QC) relaxation. For a detailed survey on
AC-OPF and convex relaxations of the AC-OPF, the reader is
referred to [7], [14]. Here, for brevity, we build our formu-
lation upon the AC-OPF formulation of [15] to facilitate the
derivation of the QC relaxation. We use the QC relaxation as it
represents a good trade-off between computational complexity
and tightness of the relaxation [15]. Note that the following
derivations could be readily extended via the many other
convex relaxations of the power flow equations [7].
A. Security-Constrained AC-OPF under Uncertainty
A power system is defined by its set N of buses. A subset
of those buses, which are denoted by G, have a controllable
generator connected. A second subset denoted by U , which can
be either generation or load buses, are subject to uncertain
power injections. It is assumed that all buses of the power
system are connected by a set (i, j) ∈ L of power lines from
bus i to bus j. To ensure the N-1 security criterion during
operation, we consider the potential outage of a list of critical
candidate lines defined by the set C ⊂ L. Note that we define
the first entry of C to correspond to the intact system state
{0}, i.e., no transmission line is outaged.
The optimization variables in the security-constrained AC-
OPF are the complex bus voltages V ck for each bus k ∈ N and
contingency c ∈ C, the complex power dispatch of generator
ScGk for each bus k ∈ G and contingency c ∈ C, and the
uncertain complex power injections SUk for each bus k ∈ U .
The uncertain power injections do not change upon outage
of system components, i.e., SU = ScU ∀c ∈ C. We assume
that the uncertain reactive power injection QU = ={SU} is
determined through a fixed power factor cosφ in relation to
the uncertain active power injection PU = <{SU}, i.e., QU =√
1−cos2 φ
cos2 φ PU . The following constraints must be satisfied for
the intact system and for each contingency c ∈ C:
(V mink )
2 ≤ V ck (V ck )∗ ≤ (V maxk )2 ∀k ∈ N (1a)
SminGk ≤ ScGk ≤ SmaxGk ∀k ∈ G (1b)
|Scij | ≤ Smaxij ∀(i, j) ∈ L (1c)
ScGk − SDk + SUk =
∑
(k,j)∈L
Sckj ∀k ∈ N (1d)
Scij = (Y
c
ij)
∗V ci (V
c
i )
∗ − (Y cij)∗V ci (V cj )∗ ∀(i, j) ∈ L (1e)
SminUk ≤ SUk ≤ SmaxUk ∀k ∈ U (1f)
− θmaxij ≤ 6 (V ci (V cj )∗) ≤ θmaxij ∀(i, j) ∈ L (1g)
The bus voltage magnitudes are constrained in (1a) by upper
and lower limits V mink and V
max
k . The superscript ∗ denotes the
complex conjugate. Similarly, the generators’ complex power
outputs are limited in (1b) by upper and lower bounds SminGk
and SmaxGk . The inequality constraints for complex variables
are defined as bounds on the real and imaginary parts. The
apparent power flow Sij on the line from i to j is upper
bounded in (1c) by Smaxij . The nodal complex power balance
(1d) including the load SD, generation SG and uncertain
injections SU has to hold for each bus. The apparent power
flow Sij on the line from i to j is defined in (1e). The term Y
denotes the admittance matrix of the power grid. Constraint
(1f) models minimum and maximum bounds SminUk , S
max
Uk
on
the uncertain injections. The flow on the line from i to j is
limited in (1g) by an upper limit on angle differences θmaxij .
We consider preventive actions in the security-constrained
AC-OPF formulation, i.e., the generator set-points remain
fixed during an outage. As a result, we include the following
linking constraints between the intact system state and the
outaged system states:
|V 0k | = |V ck | ∀k ∈ G, ∀c ∈ C\{0} (2a)
P 0Gk = P
c
Gk
∀k ∈ G\{slack}, ∀c ∈ C\{0} (2b)
The first constraint sets the generator voltage set-points |Vk|
of the outaged system states to the values from the intact
system state. The second constraint does the same for the
active power generation dispatch, excluding the slack bus
which compensates the difference in active power losses.
3B. Quadratic Convex (QC) Relaxation
The QC relaxation proposed in [15] uses convex envelopes
of the polar representation of the AC-OPF problem to relax the
dependencies among voltage variables. As proposed in [15],
[16], an additional auxiliary matrix variable W c is introduced
for the intact system state and each contingency c ∈ C, which
denotes the product of the complex bus voltages:
W cij = V
c
i (V
c
j )
∗ ∀c ∈ C (3)
This allows reformulation of (1a), (1e), (1g), and (2a) as:
(V mink )
2 ≤W ckk ≤ (V maxk )2 ∀k ∈ N (4a)
Sij = (Y
c
ij)
∗W cii − (Y cij)∗W cij ∀(i, j) ∈ L (4b)
Sij = (Y
c
ij)
∗W cjj − (Y cij)∗(W cij)∗ ∀(i, j) ∈ L (4c)
tan(−θmaxij ) ≤ <{W
c
ij}
={W c
ij
} ≤ tan(θmaxij ) ∀(i, j) ∈ L (4d)
W 0kk = W
c
kk ∀k ∈ G, ∀c ∈ C\{0} (4e)
The non-convexity is encapsulated in the voltage product (3).
To obtain a convex relaxation, the non-convex constraint (3)
is removed from the optimization problem and variables for
voltages, vci 6 θ
c
i ∀i ∈ N ∀c ∈ C, and squared current flows,
lcij ∀(i, j) ∈ L ∀c ∈ C, are added. The following convex
constraints and envelopes are introduced for the intact system
state and contingency c ∈ C [15]:
W ckk =
〈
v2k
〉T ∀k ∈ N (5a)
<{W cij} =
〈〈
vci v
c
j
〉M 〈
cos(θci − θcj)
〉C〉M ∀(i, j) ∈ L (5b)
={W cij} =
〈〈
vci v
c
j
〉M 〈
sin(θci − θcj)
〉S〉M ∀(i, j) ∈ L (5c)
Scij + S
c
ji = Z
c
ij l
c
ij ∀(i, j) ∈ L (5d)
|Scij |2 ≤W ciilcij ∀(i, j) ∈ L (5e)
The superscripts T,M,C, S denote convex envelopes for the
square, bilinear product, cosine, and sine functions, respec-
tively. The term Zij denotes the line impedance. Refer to [15]
for the complete QC formulation. The resulting relaxation of
the preventive security-constrained AC-OPF under uncertainty
is a second-order cone program (SOCP) that minimizes an
objective function, e.g., generation cost, subject to (1b)–(1d),
(1f), (2b), (4), and (5).
III. METHODOLOGY TO CREATE DATASETS
The goal of the following methodology is to create a dataset
which maps operating points described by the input vector
x to a power system security classification, e.g., secure or
insecure. The desired properties of the dataset are that it
should be balanced between secure and insecure samples,
take into consideration the degrees of freedom of the system,
and have a detailed description of the security boundary. The
power system security classification we consider is feasibility
with respect to the N-1 security-constrained AC-OPF problem
under uncertainty defined in (1) and (2). The resulting dataset
can be complemented with further assessment of dynamic
security criteria, e.g. small-signal stability [9]. The input vector
x, i.e., the control variables that define the relevant degrees of
freedom, is defined as follows:
x =
P 0Gi|V 0j |
PUk
 ∀i ∈ G\{slack}, ∀j ∈ G, ∀k ∈ U (6)
We denote with PG the active power dispatch, i.e., PG =
<{SG}. Using the input x, all other states in the AC-OPF
problem can be determined by solving the non-linear AC
power flow equations. The minimum and maximum bounds on
input vector xmax and xmin are defined in (1a), (1b), and (1f).
The main challenge in creating a representative and bal-
anced dataset is the large number of control variables. The
dimensionality of the input vector x grows substantially with
increasing system size. For instance, the IEEE 118-bus system
has 72 control variables, i.e., the dimensionality |x| is 72. A
naı¨ve approach to create a dataset would be to sample with a
prespecified discretization interval, e.g., by specifying 10 steps
in each dimension of the control variables, x1, x2, x3, . . .. For
the 118-bus system, this would require power flow solutions
for 1072 operating points, which is computationally intractable.
Further, as we will empirically show in Section IV-C, large
parts of the input space x ∈ [xmin, xmax] are infeasible. As a
result, identifying secure samples by naı¨vely sampling from
the entire input space is not possible for larger test cases.
To address these challenges, we present an efficient method
for creating such datasets. First, to a-priori classify large parts
of the input space as insecure, we propose an infeasibility
certificate based on separating hyperplanes in Section III-A.
Focusing on the unclassified regions, we then characterize the
security boundary in detail in Section III-B. Finally, we sample
inside the secure space in Section III-C.
A. Constructing Infeasibility Certificates
We propose an infeasibility certificate which can a-priori
certify regions in which the non-convex security-constrained
AC-OPF problem under uncertainty is infeasible. This exploits
the following property of a convex relaxation: if a relaxation
is infeasible for a given operating point, the original non-
convex problem is also guaranteed to be infeasible for that
operating point. The proposed infeasibility certificate has three
components: First, we employ bound tightening to tighten
both the QC relaxation and the input bounds; this better
approximates the secure region, while also reducing the sample
space. Second, we propose an infeasibility certificate based
on separating hyperplanes. Third, we present an efficient
algorithm to maximize the input region classified as infeasible.
1) Bound Tightening Algorithms: The tightness of the QC
relaxation relies on the tightness of the envelopes used in (5)
including the envelopes on cosine and sine terms. These in
turn depend on the tightness of the bounds on the voltage
magnitudes and angle differences. The goal of bound tight-
ening is to iteratively tighten voltage magnitudes and angle
differences, and, as a result, obtain a tighter relaxation. In
the context of our work, the benefits of bound tightening are
twofold: First, it tightens the QC relaxation, i.e., shrinks its
feasible space, making the infeasibility certificate based on
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Feasible space (QC relaxation) Feasible space (AC-OPF)
Fig. 1. Illustrative example of the differences between the infeasibility
certificates using hyperspheres and hyperplanes. For a given infeasible point
xˆ, the closest point x∗ is computed which is feasible to the QC relaxation. The
normal vector is perpendicular to the feasible space of the QC relaxation. The
feasible space of the non-convex AC-OPF problem is contained within that
of the convex QC relaxation. All points inside the hypersphere or all points
that are on the left side of the hyperplane are guaranteed to be infeasible
with respect to both the QC relaxation and the non-convex AC-OPF problem,
respectively. Note that the sets are not drawn to scale.
separating hyperplanes more effective, and second, it allows
us to directly tighten the bounds on the input vector x.
We use two bound tightening algorithms from the litera-
ture: First, we rely on a computationally light-weight bound
tightening technique for the branch angle differences θmaxij in
(1g) from [17]. Second, we use an optimization-based bound
tightening algorithm from [18] which tightens the voltage
magnitude bounds at each bus V max, V max in (1a), and further
tightens the angle differences for each line θmaxij in (1g).
For this purpose, we iteratively solve convex optimization
problems to calculate the maximum and minimum values
that the optimization variable under study, i.e., a voltage
magnitude or a voltage angle difference, can obtain in the
relaxed problem. Note that by tightening one variable bound,
it may be possible to further tighten a previously tightened
bound. This procedure can be executed for a defined number
of iterations or until a fixed point is reached. As a final step
in the bound tightening, we compute the tightened bounds
for the input vector x, i.e., the bounds on active power of
generators and uncertain injections. All inputs x which are
outside the tightened minimum and maximum input bounds
xBT,min, xBT,max are guaranteed to be infeasible with respect to
the non-convex AC-OPF problem. We calculate the volume of
the remaining unclassified input space volume, normalized by
the originally specified bounds on x:
VBT =
∏
k∈X
xBT,max
k
−xBT,min
k
xmax
k
−xmin
k
(7)
The input set X is defined as X : {G\{slack}, k ∈ G, k ∈ U}.
2) Separating Hyperplanes: We next propose an infeasi-
bility certificate based on separating hyperplanes. Consider
a particular operating point xˆ that is infeasible with respect
to the non-convex security-constrained AC-OPF. We solve
the following optimization problem to compute the closest
dispatch x∗ which is feasible to the convex QC relaxation:
min
x,V,SU ,SG,R
R (8a)
s.t. (1b)–(1d), (2b), (4), (5), (6) (8b)√∑
k∈X
(xk − xˆk)2 ≤ R (8c)
If the obtained radius R∗ is greater than zero, i.e., the operating
point xˆ is infeasible with respect to the relaxation, no operating
point x exists which is closer to xˆ than the obtained point x∗.
This property has been used in [8] to construct infeasibility
certificates in the form of hyperspheres and ellipses by as-
signing different weights to the components in (8c). Here, we
propose to use hyperplanes as infeasibility certificates in order
to significantly enlarge the volume classified as infeasible:
Proposition 1: For a given infeasible point xˆ, if the solution
to (8) yields a non-zero radius R∗ and optimal solution x∗,
all vectors x which fulfill the following criterion are infeasible
with respect to the AC-OPF constraints (1) and (2):
−→n T (x− x∗) < 0 (9)
The normal of the hyperplane is defined as −→n := x∗ − xˆ and
the operator T denotes the transpose.
Proof of Proposition 1: Proof by contradiction: Assume there
exists a feasible point x˜ that is inside the region classified as
infeasible by the hyperplane: −→n T (x˜−x∗) < 0. As the feasible
space of optimization problem (8) is convex, it must hold that
any linear combination between x˜ and x∗ is also feasible:
λx˜ + (1 − λ)x∗, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, there exists a point x˜∗ =
λ∗x˜+(1−λ∗)x∗ which has a radius R˜∗ to the initial infeasible
point xˆ that is smaller than R∗. Since the optimization problem
(8) is convex, we obtained the globally optimal solution x∗
with the smallest radius R∗. As a result, there cannot exist an
input x˜ that has a smaller radius than R∗. We have shown by
contradiction that there cannot exist a feasible point x˜ that is
inside the region classified as infeasible by the hyperplane. The
infeasibility certificate with respect to the non-convex AC-OPF
problem (1) and (2) follows from the property that infeasibility
with respect to the QC relaxation constraints (8b) is sufficient
to ensure infeasibility with respect to (1) and (2).
An illustrative comparison of both infeasibility certificates is
shown in Fig. 1. By solving the same optimization problem, it
is evident that the infeasibility certificate based on hyperplanes
is able to classify significantly larger spaces as infeasible.
This is quantitatively analysed through simulation studies in
Section IV-B.
3) An Efficient Algorithm to Minimize the Unclassified
Input Space: Using the infeasibility certificate, we propose an
efficient algorithm to maximize the portion of the input space
that can be classified a-priori as infeasible. Our algorithm
relies on an insight related to the hyperplanes: together with
the initial input space restriction, subsequent hyperplanes form
a convex polyhedron which can be described as Ax ≤ b.
We can write the row of A and entry in b corresponding
to the hyperplane in (9) as Ak := −→n T and bk := −→n Tx∗.
Efficient methods to sample uniformly from inside a convex
polyhedron are available, e.g., “Hit-and-Run” sampling [19].
5Algorithm 1 Computing Infeasibility Certificates
1: Run bound tightening and obtain xBT,min and xBT,max
2: Set iteration count: k ← 0
3: Initialize unclassified region A(0)x ≤ b(0):
A(0) := [I|x|×|x| − I|x|×|x|]T
b(0) : = [(xBT,max)T (xBT,min)T ]T
4: while k ≤ N1 do
5: draw random x(k) from inside A(k)x ≤ b(k)
6: solve (8) with xˆ := x(k) and obtain x∗
7: if R > 0 then
8: reduce unclassified region by adding hyperplane:
A(k+1) = [(A(k))T −→n T ]T
b(k+1) = [(b(k))T −→n Tx∗]T
9: end if
10: k ← k + 1
11: end while.
This allows us to iteratively construct hyperplanes while
sampling only inside the currently unclassified region. Thus,
the hyperplane certificates facilitate a significant improvement
on the “rejection” sampling approach used with hypersphere
certificates in [8], [9].
The steps of the algorithm to compute infeasibility certifi-
cates are detailed in Algorithm 1. We start with a description of
the convex polyhedron restricted to the tightened input bounds.
We iteratively sample uniformly from inside the convex poly-
hedron and add identified hyperplanes until we reach an upper
iteration limit of N1 samples. This ensures that only samples
which have not yet been classified as infeasible by previously
added hyperplanes are considered in optimization problem
(8). In Section IV-C, we will demonstrate the performance of
this algorithm on a range of PGLib-OPF networks up to 500
buses by calculating the remaining unclassified volume as the
volume of the convex polyhedron A(N1)x ≤ b(N1). This shows
substantial reductions of unclassified input space volumes.
B. Security Boundary Identification
After computing the infeasibility certificates, we perform
sampling and directed walks, similar to [9], to obtain a detailed
description of the security boundary. For this purpose, we first
uniformly draw a large number N2 of samples from the convex
polyhedron describing the remaining unclassified input region:
A(N1)x ≤ b(N1). For each sample, we first run AC power
flows for the intact and the outaged system states and check
if any of the constraints in (1) are violated. If not, we add the
current point to the dataset as a feasible point, otherwise as an
infeasible point. If constraints are violated, we run additional
AC power flows for which we enforce the reactive power limits
of generators, i.e., if any generator violates its reactive power
limit it is converted from a PV to a PQ bus in the power flow.
This is based on the observation that reactive power limits are
often the only constraints violated. If the obtained power flow
solutions satisfy all constraints in (1), the point is added as
feasible point to the dataset. Note that the voltage set-points
of generators in x are updated accordingly. If both stages are
not feasible, we solve the following non-convex optimization
problem which computes the closest feasible dispatch to the
non-convex AC-OPF problem in (1) and (2):
min
x,V,SU ,SG,R
R (10a)
s.t. (1), (2a), (2b), (6), (8c) (10b)
We add the obtained locally optimal point x∗ to the dataset
as feasible point. We repeat this procedure for all N2 samples
and obtain as a result a detailed security boundary description.
C. Sampling from Inside the Secure Space
To obtain a more detailed description of the entire secure
space, we fit a multivariate normal distribution N to the
feasible points obtained. To this end, we estimate both the
mean µ and the covariance matrix Σ from the feasible data
points. To bias the sampling towards inside the boundary, we
reduce the magnitude of all entries of the covariance matrix,
i.e., Σred = sred · Σ, by a constant scaling factor sred < 1. We
draw a large number, denoted N3, of samples fromN (µ,Σred).
For each of these samples, we first run AC power flows for
the intact and the outaged system states, check feasibility with
respect to all AC-OPF constraints, and add the sample with
the corresponding classification to the dataset. If the sample is
infeasible, we run a second round of AC power flows in which
we enforce the generators’ reactive limits and again evaluate
the feasibility with respect to all AC-OPF constraints. If the
sample is feasible, we add it to the dataset with the gener-
ator voltage set-points adjusted accordingly. Our simulations
indicate that sampling from a multivariate normal distribution
N (µ,Σred) results in identification of feasible samples inside
the secure space. We did not observe improvements by fitting
a Gaussian mixture model.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We analyse the performance of our proposed methodology
for a range of test cases from the PGLib-OPF networks. First,
we compare the proposed infeasibility certificate based on
separating hyperplanes with the certificate based on hyper-
spheres from [8]. Second, we compute the volume of the
unclassified input space using the infeasibility certificates and
show substantial reductions. Third, we create balanced datasets
and demonstrate their applicability using an illustrative data-
driven application.
A. Simulation Setup
In the following, we first evaluate our proposed methods
on 13 PGLib-OPF networks (v19.05) [20] up to 500 buses
for which we do not consider N-1 security and uncertainty,
i.e., we use the test cases as specified in [20]. Second, we
use two test cases for which we include both N-1 security
and uncertainty. We use case39 epri and case162 ieee dtc
with the following line contingencies C = {0, 7, 22, 24, 36, 43}
and C = {6, 8, 24, 50, 128}, respectively. We assume the
same parameters for the outaged system state as for the
intact system state. Furthermore, we place 3 wind farms with
rated power of 500 MW and consider 3 uncertain loads
with ±50% variability, i.e., a total of 6 uncertain power
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Fig. 2. For case39 epri and case162 ieee dtc, we compare the remaining
unclassified volume between an infeasibility certificate based on hyperspheres
from [8] and the proposed certificate in Section III-A2 based on hyperplanes.
injections, at buses U = {3, 21, 27, 4, 25, 28} for case39 epri
and U = {60, 90, 145, 3, 8, 52} for case162 ieee dtc. For all
uncertain injections, we assume a power factor cosφ = 1. Note
that in the following, all inputs x are normalized with respect
to their maximum and minimum limits as specified in [20], i.e.,
if x has dimension |x|, then x ∈ [0, 1]|x|. This normalization
step is standard practice for many data-driven applications
including neural networks and improves performance [21]. For
both AC power flow and AC optimal power flow computations,
we rely on MATPOWER [22] with the IPOPT solver for AC-
OPF problems [23]. For the bound tightening, we use the
implementations in [17], [18]. Note that we only tighten the
bounds of the intact system state, and we run the optimization-
based bound tightening for up to three iterations. Extension of
these toolboxes to the full N-1 case is a direction for future
work. To solve the QC relaxation we use MOSEK [24]. To
approximate the volumes of the convex polyhedrons describing
the remaining unclassified input space, we use a volume
approximation toolbox in C++ [25]. Note that an exact volume
computation is considered intractable for dimensionality 10 or
higher [25]. The relative approximation error threshold is set
to be less than one order of magnitude, which is sufficiently
accurate for our purposes since we compute volumes of spaces
several orders of magnitudes smaller than the initial volume.
B. Comparison of Infeasiblity Certificates
We compare the infeasibility certificate based on hyper-
spheres proposed in [8] with the infeasibility certificate based
on hyperplanes proposed in Section III-A2. The main metric
for comparison is the volume of the remaining unclassified
space after applying the infeasibility certificates. We consider
case39 epri and case162 ieee dtc. We assume that both al-
gorithms rely on the QC relaxation, all the bounds have been
tightened as described in Section III-A1, we only consider the
active power generation in the input variables x, and we do
not consider N-1 security or uncertainty. For the certificate
based on hyperplanes, we follow the algorithm outlined in
Algorithm 1. For the certificate based on hyperspheres, we
assume that in each iteration we draw a random sample from
the entire input space, and if it is infeasible we compute
the closest feasible input x by solving (8). If the distance
is non-zero, we have obtained an infeasibility certificate. To
estimate the volume of the unclassified space not covered
by the hyperspheres we use Monte Carlo sampling with 106
samples. Fig. 2 shows the variation of the unclassified input
volume with up to 50 iterations. It can be observed, first, that
the hyperplane certificates shrink the unclassified region by
TABLE I
UNCLASSIFIED INPUT VOLUMES FOR PGLIB-OPF NETWORKS
case |x| V BT |HP | V HP − log10(V )|x|
AC-OPF without N-1 security and without uncertainty
case3 lmbd 4 6.3e-02 28 3.3e-02 37.0%
case5 pjm 7 1.0e+00 99 6.9e-03 30.9%
case14 ieee 6 2.4e-01 54 6.9e-04 52.7%
case24 ieee rts 20 9.2e-01 184 2.3e-06 28.2%
case30 ieee 7 6.2e-03 61 8.8e-06 72.2%
case39 epri 19 9.9e-02 203 7.0e-08 37.7%
case57 ieee 10 3.8e-02 231 4.9e-06 53.1%
case73 ieee rts 62 1.0e+00 608 6.1e-16 24.5%
case118 ieee 72 1.7e-02 1000 1.6e-17 23.3%
case162 ieee dtc 23 6.1e-04 371 1.5e-11 47.1%
case200 tamu 69 9.3e-01 1000 6.0e-11 14.8%
case300 ieee 125 1.0e-12 1000 3.4e-40 31.6%
case500 tamu 111 8.6e-02 1000 5.4e-26 22.8%
AC-OPF considering N-1 security and uncertainty
case39 epri 25 2.6e-01 271 2.0e-05 18.8%
case162 ieee dtc 29 2.2e-04 394 6.0e-10 31.8%
Median all cases 23 8.6e-02 271 7.0e-08 31.6%
four orders of magnitude more than the hyperspheres, i.e., the
unclassified volumes evaluate to 10−5 versus 10−1 compared
to the initial unit hypercube’s normalized volume of 1. Second,
the algorithm using hyperplanes requires significantly fewer
iterations. After the first iteration, the hyperplanes classify a
substantially larger space as infeasible than the hyperspheres
after 50 iterations. The reasons for this are twofold: First, as
evident in Fig. 1, certificates based on separating hyperplanes
cover a larger volume than hyperspheres for the same sample
and second, the hyperplanes enable the use of efficient meth-
ods for sampling uniformly from inside the associated convex
polyhedron [19], [25].
C. Estimating Unclassified Volumes for PGLib-OPF Networks
In the following, we compute infeasibility certificates and
the volume of the remaining unclassified input space for a
range of test cases. For this purpose, we run Algorithm 1
with the number of iterations N1 set to 1000. We evaluate the
remaining estimated volume for the bound tightening V BT
according to (7) and for the separating hyperplanes described
as a convex polyhedron by running the volume approximation
algorithm in [25]. In Table I, the dimensionality |x|, the
reduced unclassified volume V BT after bound tightening, the
number of hyperplanes |HP |, and the reduced unclassified
volume V HP enclosed by the separating hyperplanes is listed.
Note that both volumes are defined with respect to the unit hy-
percube x ∈ [0 1]|x| normalized by the original power system
limits with volume 1. We can make several observations. First,
the bound tightening results in a moderate reduction in input
dimensionality of several orders of magnitude (10−1 to 10−4)
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CREATED DATASETS FOR AC-OPF PROBLEMS
Power system case Boundary Inside Overall Overall
(MVND) Secure Points
N2 = 104 N3 = 105
AC-OPF without N-1 security and without uncertainty
case3 lmbd 69.5% 36.5% 40.6% 114’389
case5 pjm 68.6% 69.4% 69.3% 125’432
case14 ieee 73.3% 59.0% 61.0% 147’047
case24 ieee rts 66.8% 44.3% 48.7% 131’158
case30 ieee 75.0% 50.2% 54.0% 124’944
case39 epri 57.2% 29.9% 33.9% 154’635
case57 ieee 58.9% 35.2% 38.9% 150’865
case73 ieee rts 63.9% 51.1% 52.7% 222’730
case118 ieee 53.2% 47.0% 47.6% 209’996
case162 ieee dtc 50.0% 40.1% 41.7% 129’165
case200 tamu 50.2% 36.6% 38.1% 177’023
case300 ieee 50.0% 32.6% 34.7% 163’087
case500 tamu 50.0% 35.4% 37.1% 174’774
AC-OPF considering N-1 security and uncertainty
case39 epri 58.2% 78.2% 75.2% 139’756
case162 ieee dtc 50.0% 17.9% 23.2% 121’358
Average all cases 59.7% 44.2% 46.5% 152’424
for most test cases. Second, the infeasibility certificates based
on hyperplanes enable further substantial reductions in the
unclassified volume. As a result, the total unclassified volume
compared to the unit hypercube is reduced between 2 and
40 orders of magnitude (10−2 to 10−40). The median of the
unclassified volume is 10−8. This means that in order to
identify one sample inside the unclassified volume, we would
have to uniformly draw 108 samples from the original bounds
on the input x. This highlights the necessity of first computing
the infeasibility certificates to be able to identify the secure
space. The number of hyperplanes is below 1000 for most
test cases, indicating that Algorithm 1 has obtained a good
estimation of the unclassified volume. For the four test cases
for which 1000 hyperplanes are added, the unclassified input
volume could be further reduced by increasing N1.
To allow for comparability between test cases, we propose
to use a metric defined as − log10(V )|x| . The metric is motivated
as follows: If one wants to sample 10 steps in each dimension,
i.e., 10|x|, then this metric quantifies by how much the expo-
nent is reduced. Note that the value obtained in percent is not
the dimensionality reduction itself but relates to the reduction
in the orders of magnitudes of the dimensionality. This value is
between 14.8% and 72.2% for all test cases, showcasing the
general applicability of the proposed infeasibility certificate
for AC-OPF problems.
D. Dataset Creation for PGLib-OPF Networks
We create datasets of operating points classified based on
their feasibility with respect to AC-OPF problems including
TABLE III
TEST SET ACCURACY OF NEURAL NETWORK CLASSIFIERS
case full dataset only boundary
AC-OPF without N-1 security and without uncertainty
case14 ieee 78.2% 60.5%
case39 epri 74.6% 38.5%
case162 ieee dtc 84.4% 49.8%
AC-OPF including N-1 security and uncertainty
case39 epri 81.0% 80.4%
case162 ieee dtc 93.4% 31.9%
N-1 security and uncertainty. To this end, we first draw a
number of samples N2 = 104 from the inside of the re-
maining unclassified volume described in Table I and obtain a
detailed security boundary description following the approach
in Section III-B. We fit a multivariate normal distribution with
sred = 0.25 and classify N3 = 105 samples as secure or
insecure following the approach in Section III-C. In Table II,
we list the characteristics of the obtained datasets. First, note
that in the boundary identification stage, if the percentage of
secure points is above 50%, then sampling directly from the
remaining unclassified volume results in identifying secure
operating points. This is the case for the majority of test cases,
demonstrating that the infeasibility certificate is able to provide
a tight approximation of the secure spaces of non-convex AC-
OPF problems. For the test cases where the sampling did
not find any secure samples, the number of iterations for the
feasibility certificate could be enlarged or other relaxations
such as moment-based relaxations described in [7] could be
used to further reduce the unclassified space in Algorithm 1.
Second, the results show that sampling from a multivariate
normal distribution fitted to the boundary samples results
in identification of a large number of secure samples. The
resulting datasets are well balanced with on average 46.5%
secure samples. Note that this is an important metric for the
successful application of data-driven methods such as neural
networks [1]. The number of overall points is dependent on
the number of feasible samples identified by enforcing the
generators’ reactive power limits in the AC power flows and
differs between the test cases. Regarding the computational
tractability, all simulations were carried out on a laptop and
the dataset creation for the largest test cases took a few
hours, with the most computationally intense task being the
AC-OPF evaluations in the boundary identification and the
optimization-based bound tightening [18]. By using high-
performance computing and parallelizing both the boundary
identification and the AC power flow computations, we expect
that our approach can scale to systems with thousands of buses.
E. Training Neural Network Classifiers
As an illustrative data-driven application, we evaluate the
performance of a neural network classifier trained on several
of the created datasets. The neural network predicts a binary
classification, i.e., whether the input x belongs to the class
“secure” or “insecure”. We choose neural network structures
with five hidden layers with the numbers of neurons of each
hidden layer selected to be 10 times the input dimension |x|.
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all samples and a test set of the remaining 15%. Note that the
classifier has no information of the test set during training,
and its performance is evaluated on the test set only. This
gives a metric for how well the classifier generalizes to unseen
data. We train the neural networks using TensorFlow [21] with
standard training parameters and 250 epochs. Table III shows
the test set accuracy, i.e., the share of correctly predicted labels
for the test set. First, we use 85% of the full dataset for
training and 15% of the full dataset for testing. Second, we
only use the boundary samples from Section III-B as training
data and then test on 15% of the full dataset. This gives us
an estimation of the benefit of the additional sampling from
the fitted multivariate distribution in Section III-C. We observe
that the neural network classifier is able to generalize from the
training to the test set and achieve high accuracy when using
the full dataset. To further increase the classification accuracy,
deeper neural networks or a deep autoencoder to identify
lower-dimensional features could be used. We also observe
that only relying on the boundary samples for prediction is
not sufficient for most test cases, higlighting the importance
of obtaining a representative dataset.
V. CONCLUSION
Successful application of data-driven methods in power sys-
tems requires datasets of sufficient size, covering a wide range
of operating points. Creating a dataset that characterizes the
security boundary and sufficiently covers both secure and inse-
cure operating regions is a highly computationally demanding
task, even for medium-sized systems, as we showed in [9].
In this paper, we propose an efficient method to create such
datasets. We focus on AC-OPF feasibility and N-1 security, as
any operating point should first satisfy static security criteria.
Future work will extend this to include dynamic security
criteria, similar to [9]. We develop an infeasibility certificate
based on separating hyperplanes which is able to classify large
portions of the input space as insecure. We show that the
infeasibility certificates reduce the unclassified input space
volumes significantly, by up to 10−40 compared to an initial
normalized input space volume of 1 (i.e., 100) based on defined
control variable bounds. Although the secure operating region
is a very small portion of the original input space, our method
is able to produce balanced datasets of secure and insecure
operating points, a property desired for successful applications
of data-driven methods. As an illustrative application, we
used the generated datasets to assess the performance of
neural network classifiers. Future work is directed towards
(i) utilizing convex restrictions from [26], [27] to characterize
secure spaces and (ii) exploiting high-performance computing.
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